We should not forget that the most active phase of the military operations in 2004 in the Tskhinvali region fell on 13-19 August. It is not so easy to prove it but military operations on the Georgian territory always start in the summer, specifically in August. Notably, it is in the summer time when forests are totally sunk in green cover providing an ideal camouflage to armed groups and military machines. Certainly this must be a serious military circumstance.
In August 1992, at the beginning of the war in Apkhazeti, the forest factor was used by particular separatist armed groups to attack columns of Georgian guards moving on the Ochamchire-Sokhumi road. Similarly, in August 2008, in the Tskhinvali region local separatist armed groups would hide in forests, for instance, to the east of Tskhinvali town. Nevertheless availability of perfect hideouts for guerilla groups in summer forests is not the main reason behind the phenomenon.
In reality, summer and especially August is characterized by least precipitation and hence offers least restrains to military aviation, including destroyers and attack helicopters flying at low altitudes. Any side of the conflict which disposes of a major aerial advantage and is capable of stopping ground units of the enemy via such aerial dominance is also better poised to utilize optimal weather conditions for military aviation. In other words, the Georgian sky in the summer, especially in August is a blessing for Russian military aviation to achieve overwhelming advantage for aerial bombardments, as it exactly did during the August war in 2008.
When in December 1994 Russian Federal Forces swarmed Chechen capital Grozny, they suffered heavy losses during street battles. Subsequently, Russian generals were admitting that one of the reasons behind their New Year Grozny attack failure was inability of military planes and attack helicopters to provide the cover to their ground squads. It was nature that led to this inability. In the winter time mists, cloudiness and generally nasty weather conditions are frequent in the north Caucasus. In 1994, Russian attack planes and helicopters lacked modern means of navigation and fire Management and Russian pilots were under-trained in flying under complex weather conditions. As a result, a number of Russian military planes actually crashed into hilltops in Chechnya. Even if 14 years passed after the 1994 war, Russian pilots still looked to possess mediocre skills in the five-day Russian-Georgian war in 2008. Had it not beem for open skies, no one would have managed to fly in the Georgian space.
If the military operations in 2008 were to start in November or December, intrusion of Russian military units via the Roki tunnel into the Tskhinvali region of Georgia would have turned into an arduous task. It’s not just bad weather conditions that would have thwarted any attempt of Russian military aviation to traverse the Georgian skies. It is also snow, winds and avalanches which are frequent on the only road on the Russian side that leads into the Roki tunnel. Likewise treacherous is the road that connects the Roki tunnel with Tskhinvali town. It is next to impossible for armed vehicles to overtake it in the winter time. Besides, in autumn and winter navigation gets harder in the Black Sea also. It in turn would have created a huge predicament for the transfer of Russian marines from ships on to the Apkhazeti shores. In August though, these same ships coming from Novorossiysk to Ochamchire easily did this rapid coastal deployment job.
Unfortunately, the Georgian Authorities have neither in 1992 nor in 2004 or especially in 2008 taken into account the factor of summer time and brilliant weather conditions for the Russian military aviation and have consistently failed to utilize a natural barrier of the Caucasian range and complexity associated with overtaking roads via the Roki tunnel.
GEL
